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Which Law Is Supreme? The Interplay 
Between the New York Convention and 
The McCarran-Ferguson Act 
BRIAN A. BRIZ* & CÉSAR MEJÍA-DUEÑAS* 
The McCarran-Ferguson Act was enacted in 1945 to 
safeguard the rights of the states to regulate the business of 
insurance. It provides that acts of Congress not specifically 
related to the business of insurance are superseded by state 
laws that regulate the business of insurance. In 1970, the 
United States ratified the Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the New York 
Convention). Congress enacted Chapter 2 of the Federal Ar-
bitration Act to implement the New York Convention. The 
New York Convention requires courts to recognize and en-
force both private agreements to arbitrate and arbitration 
awards made in other contracting states. Because the 
McCarran-Ferguson Act, on the one hand, provides that 
general federal laws not related to the business of insurance 
are superseded by state insurance laws, and the New York 
Convention, on the other hand, obligates courts to recognize 
and enforce private arbitration agreements and arbitral 
awards, courts have struggled with whether the New York 
Convention preempts state insurance laws that prohibit ar-
bitration of insurance disputes. Indeed, several states have 
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enacted legislation prohibiting clauses in insurance con-
tracts divesting the state courts of jurisdiction, while many 
others have excluded insurance contracts from their corre-
sponding arbitration codes. We address this conflict be-
tween the McCarran-Ferguson Act and the New York Con-
vention and, specifically, analyze how courts within the 
Eleventh Circuit have decided the issue. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. Regulation of the Business of Insurance – Enactment of the 
McCarran-Ferguson Act 
Traditionally, “the States enjoyed a virtually exclusive domain 
over the insurance industry.”1 Indeed, in 1869, the U.S. Supreme 
Court held in Paul v. Virginia that “[i]ssuing a policy of insurance 
is not a transaction of commerce,” and hence not subject to federal 
regulation.2 In 1944, however, the U.S. Supreme Court held that an 
insurance company that conducted business across state lines was 
engaged in interstate commerce, and therefore, subject to federal 
laws (in that case, antitrust laws).3 
In order to assuage fears that the federal government would in-
trude on the states’ power to tax and regulate the insurance industry, 
“Congress moved quickly to restore the supremacy of the States in 
the realm of insurance regulation.”4 Consequently, in 1945, Con-
gress enacted the McCarran-Ferguson Act,5 (“MFA”), wherein, 
among other things, it declared that the “continued regulation and 
taxation by the several States of the business of insurance is in the 
public interest . . . .”6 Thus, the MFA reinforced that the states have 
near-exclusive authority to regulate the business of insurance. 
The MFA contains two primary provisions relevant to this chap-
ter. First, section 1012(a) vests in the states the authority to regulate 
the business of insurance by providing that “[t]he business of insur-
ance, and every person engaged therein, shall be subject to the laws 
of the several States which relate to the regulation or taxation of such 
business.”7 Second, section 1012(b) contains a reverse-preemption 
provision that provides: “[n]o Act of Congress shall be construed to 
invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enacted by any State for the 
purpose of regulating the business of insurance . . . .”8 In other 
 
 1 St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S. 531, 539 (1978). 
 2 Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (1 Wall.) 168, 183 (1869). 
 3 United States v. Se. Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 546–51 (1944) 
(holding that the Sherman Antitrust Act applied to the business of insurance, and 
therefore, insurance could be regulated by Congress under the Commerce Clause). 
 4 U.S. Dep’t of Treasury v. Fabe, 508 U.S. 491, 499–500 (1993). 
 5 McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–1015 (1946). 
 6 Id. § 1011. 
 7 Id. § 1012(a). 
 8 Id. §§ 1012(a)–(b). 
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words, acts of Congress that do not specifically relate to the business 
of insurance are reverse-preempted by state insurance laws and reg-
ulations.9 
B. State Laws Restricting Arbitration of Insurance Claims 
Approximately one-third of the states have enacted legislation 
prohibiting or restricting arbitration of disputes against insurers. 
Six states have enacted laws prohibiting clauses in insurance 
contracts that deprive the respective state courts of jurisdiction over 
disputes against insurers, or in the case of Maine,10 against foreign 
insurers. These states include Hawaii,11 Louisiana,12 Massachu-
setts,13 Virginia,14 and Washington.15 
Additionally, ten states have excluded certain types of disputes 
arising from insurance contracts from their respective arbitration 
codes. These states include Arkansas,16 Georgia,17 Kentucky,18 Mis-
souri,19 Montana,20 Nebraska,21 Oklahoma,22 South Carolina,23 
South Dakota,24 and Vermont.25 The District of Columbia has also 
enacted legislation declaring arbitration clauses in consumer insur-
ance contracts void and unenforceable.26 
Finally, California has enacted a law that restricts the arbitration 
of disputes with healthcare insurers by requiring certain formalities 
in the arbitration agreements in order for them to be enforceable.27 
 
 9 Id. § 1012(b). 
 10 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2433 (2019). 
 11 HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431:10-221 (WEST 2019). 
 12 LA. STAT. ANN. § 22:868 (2019). 
 13 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 175, § 22 (2019). 
 14 VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-312 (2019). 
 15 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 48.18.200 (West 2020). 
 16 ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-108-230 (West 2019). 
 17 GA. CODE ANN § 9-9-2 (West 2020). 
 18 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 417.050 (West 2020). 
 19 MO. ANN. STAT. § 435.350 (West 2019). 
 20 MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-5-114 (West 2019). 
 21 NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-2602.01 (West 2019). 
 22 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1855 (West 2019). 
 23 S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-48-10 (2019). 
 24 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-25A-3 (2019). 
 25 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 5653 (West 2019). 
 26 D.C. CODE § 16-4403(c)(1), (d) (2020). 
 27 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1363.1 (West 2020). 
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C. The New York Convention and the Chapter 2 of the Federal 
Arbitration Act 
The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards (“Convention”) was established in 1958 to provide 
standard procedures for the recognition and enforcement of private 
arbitration agreements entered into in fellow contracting states, and 
to recognize and enforce arbitral awards issued in such states.28 Spe-
cifically, the Convention requires signatories to (1) recognize and 
enforce written agreements to submit disputes to non-domestic ar-
bitration, and (2) enforce non-domestic arbitral awards entered in 
contracting states29 absent any of the enumerated grounds for re-
fusal.30 
As indicated in the U.S. Senate Report concerning the imple-
mentation of the Convention, the United States did not sign the Con-
vention when it was originally adopted due to concern that certain 
provisions contained therein conflicted with domestic laws.31 Sub-
sequently, Congress amended the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) 
and included Chapter 2 to incorporate and implement the Conven-
tion.32 
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
Federal Circuit Courts have split on whether the MFA preempts 
the Convention and Chapter 2 of the FAA, and if it does, to what 
extent. Specifically, the courts have split on whether, under the 
MFA, state laws that restrict or prohibit the arbitration of insurance 
disputes are preempted by the Convention. 
 
 28 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards arts I–III, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517 [hereinafter New York Conven-
tion]. 
 29 Id. 
 30 Albert Jan van den Berg, Why Are Some Awards Not Enforceable?, in 
INT’L COUNCIL FOR COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION CONG., SER. NO. 12, NEW 
HORIZONS IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND BEYOND 291, 
291–92 (Albert Jan van den Berg ed., 2005). 
 31 H.R. REP. NO. 91-1181 (1970), as reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3601, 
3601–02. 
 32 Id. at 3602. 
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In U.S. Department of Treasury v. Fabe, the U.S. Supreme Court 
established a three-prong test to determine whether federal laws un-
related to the business of insurance are reverse-preempted by state 
insurance laws and regulations under the MFA.33 Under the test, 
courts must consider whether (1) the state statute was enacted for 
the purpose of regulating the business of insurance; (2) the federal 
statute involved “does not specifically relat[e] to the business of in-
surance”; and (3) the application of the federal statute would “inval-
idate, impair, or supersede” the state statute regulating insurance.34 
While the Fabe test provides guidance for resolving conflicts 
between federal laws and state insurance laws, it provides little guid-
ance as to whether the Convention, an international treaty, super-
sedes the MFA.35 Complicating the issue is the fact that courts have 
not agreed on if the Convention is self-executing. Several courts 
have declined to determine whether the convention is self-executing 
but have nonetheless held the Convention supersedes the MFA.36 
Other courts have found it is not self-executing because the Conven-
tion was enacted through Chapter 2 of the FAA, and it is therefore 
an act of Congress that interferes with state laws regulating the busi-
ness of insurance, and consequently, is reverse-preempted under the 
MFA.37 
A. Cases Holding the Convention is Superseded by the MFA 
The Second and Eighth Circuits have found that, under the 
MFA, state-level anti-arbitration provisions supersede the Conven-
tion and Chapter 2 of the FAA. These Circuits have concluded that 
 
 33 U.S. Dep’t of Treasury v. Fabe, 508 U.S. 491, 500–01 (1993). 
 34 Id. In Union Labor Life Insurance v. Pireno, the U.S. Supreme Court iden-
tified three criteria that are relevant to determining what constitutes the “business 
of insurance”: “first, whether the practice has the effect of transferring or spread-
ing a policyholder’s risk; second, whether the practice is an integral part of the 
policy relationship between the insurer and the insured; and third, whether the 
practice is limited to entities within the insurance industry.” 458 U.S. 119, 129 
(1982) (emphasis in original) (citation omitted). 
 35 See Fabe, 508 U.S. at 500–01. 
 36 Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 587 
F.3d 714, 717 (5th Cir. 2009); ESAB Grp. v. Zurich Ins., 685 F.3d 376, 380 (4th 
Cir. 2012). 
 37 Stephens v. Am. Int’l Ins., 66 F.3d 41, 45–46 (2d Cir. 1995). 
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the Convention—because it was enacted by implementing legisla-
tion through Chapter 2 of the FAA—is not a self-executing treaty, 
and therefore, does not preempt conflicting state laws under the Su-
premacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution.38  
The Second Circuit first addressed the issue in Stephens v. Amer-
ican International Insurance Co.39 Stephens concerned a dispute be-
tween an insolvent insurance company chartered under the laws of 
Kentucky and a foreign reinsurer arising from a reinsurance contract 
containing a broad arbitration clause.40 The first issue the court had 
to decide was whether the FAA preempts the Kentucky Liquidation 
Act, a state law which contains an “anti-arbitration provision” and 
regulates the performance of insurance contracts once an insurer is 
insolvent.41 Because the Kentucky Liquidation Act was a law en-
acted “for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance,” the 
court held the law was preserved and not preempted by the FAA, 
which does not specifically relate to the business of insurance.42 Be-
yond this, the court also held that the Convention did not preempt 
the Kentucky Liquidation Act under the Supremacy Clause because 
it is not self-executing and “relies upon an Act of Congress for its 
implementation.”43 Specifically, the court held that the Conven-
tion’s “implementing legislation”—Chapter 2 of the FAA—does 
not preempt the Kentucky Liquidation Act, and, therefore, is “inap-
plicable” to the dispute in question.44 Thus, even though the Con-
vention mandates the recognition and enforcement of private agree-
ments to arbitrate amongst parties in contracting states, the Conven-
tion was reverse-preempted by the “anti-arbitration” provision in the 
Kentucky Liquidation Act.45 
 
 38 Id. at 45. 
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. at 42–43. 
 41 Id. at 43–45. 
 42 Id. at 44–45. 
 43 Id. at 45. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. at 45–46. In a subsequent decision, however, the Second Circuit held 
that the MFA did not supersede the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”) 
because Congress intended for the FSIA to preempt all contrary state law. Ste-
phens v. Nat’l Distillers & Chem. Corp., 69 F.3d 1226, 1232 (2d Cir. 1995). Rec-
ognizing the potential conflict with its earlier decision, the court noted that the 
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The Eight Circuit arrived at the same conclusion in Transit Cas-
ualty Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s of London.46 Like Ste-
phens, Transit involved a dispute between an insolvent insurance 
company (this time, a Missouri company) and a foreign reinsurer 
wherein the subject reinsurance agreement contained an arbitration 
clause.47 Also like in Stephens, the Transit court found that Mis-
souri’s arbitration statute—which expressly exempts insurance con-
tracts from the categories of agreements that may contain enforcea-
ble agreements to arbitrate—is not preempted by the FAA or the 
Convention because unlike the latter laws, the former law was en-
acted for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance.48 
While the Transit court did not expressly address whether the Con-
vention is self-executing, it explained that the Convention was im-
plemented by Congress through the amendment of the FAA, and 
specifically, through the inclusion of Chapter 2 of the FAA.49  
B. Cases Holding the MFA Does Not Supersede the 
Convention 
In contrast with the Second and Eighth Circuits, the Fifth and 
Fourth Circuits have rejected the argument that, under the MFA, 
state arbitration laws related to the business of insurance reverse-
preempt the Convention.50 For different reasons, they have each 
held that state-level insurance disputes are not exempt from the Con-
vention pursuant to the MFA’s reverse-preemption provision.51 
Sitting en banc, the Fifth Circuit addressed the interaction be-
tween the MFA and the Convention in Safety National Casualty 
Corp. v. Certain Underwriters At Lloyd’s, London.52 There, the 
 
same reasoning might apply to Chapter 2 of the FAA, but the court declined to 
consider the conflict at that time. Id. at 1233 n.6. 
 46 Transit Cas. Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s of London, 119 F.3d 
619, 621–22 (8th Cir. 1997). 
 47 Id. at 620. 
 48 Id. at 621, 623–24. 
 49 Id. at 620. 
 50 Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 587 
F.3d 714, 717 (5th Cir. 2009); ESAB Grp. v. Zurich Ins., 685 F.3d 376, 380 (4th 
Cir. 2012). 
 51 Safety Nat’l, 587 F.3d at 724; ESAB Grp., 685 F.3d at 388, 390. 
 52 Safety Nat’l, 587 F.3d at 717. 
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court found it was “unclear” whether the Convention is self-execut-
ing because the requirements of the Convention are largely compul-
sory, but the Supreme Court had suggested in dicta that at least por-
tions of the Convention are not self-executing.53 Notwithstanding, 
the court went on to hold that even if the Convention was not self-
executing, the Convention nonetheless supersedes the MFA for two 
primary reasons.54 
First, the MFA only reverse preempts acts of Congress or stat-
utes, not treaties.55 A treaty, the court held, “remains an international 
agreement or contract negotiated by the Executive Branch and rati-
fied by the Senate, not by Congress[,]” and even if it is implemented 
by Congress, it “does not mean that it ceases to be a treaty and be-
comes an ‘Act of Congress.’”56 
Second, even though the Convention was implemented through 
Chapter 2 of the FAA, it is the Convention and not Chapter 2 of the 
FAA that supersedes state law.57 Indeed, as explained by the court, 
Chapter 2 provides, at 9 U.S.C. § 203, that “[a]n action or proceed-
ing falling under the Convention shall be deemed to arise under the 
laws and treaties of the United States.”58 This, the court explained, 
is “a direct indication that Congress thought that for jurisdictional 
purposes, an action falling under the Convention arose not only un-
der the laws of the United States but also under treaties of the United 
States.”59 Chapter 2 of the FAA, the court further explained, defines 
when an arbitration agreement “falls under the Convention” and 
provides United States courts with jurisdiction over “[a]n action or 
proceeding falling under the Convention . . . .”60 Accordingly, be-
cause Chapter 2 of the FAA “directs us to the treaty it implemented,” 
 
 53 Id. at 721–22 (citing Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 521–22 (2008)). 
 54 Id. at 722–24. 
 55 Id. at 722 (“Even if the Convention required legislation to implement some 
or all of its provisions in United States courts, that does not mean that Congress 
intended an ‘Act of Congress,’ as that phrase is used in the McCarran-Ferguson 
Act, to encompass a non-self-executing treaty that has been implemented by con-
gressional legislation.”). 
 56 Id. at 723 (citations omitted). 
 57 Id. at 724–25. 
 58 Id. at 724 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 203 (2018)). 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 202). 
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it is the treaty itself that we construe, and not the implementing leg-
islation, when determining whether the Convention supersedes state 
law.61 In other words, because “the Convention, an implemented 
treaty, rather than the Convention Act, supersedes state law, the 
[MFA’s] provision that ‘no Act of Congress’ shall be construed to 
supersede state law regulating the business of insurance is inappli-
cable.”62 
Less than three years after the Safety National decision, the 
Fourth Circuit also grappled with the issue as to whether the Con-
vention supersedes the MFA in ESAB Group, Inc. v. Zurich Insur-
ance PLC.63 In ESAB, the defendants—foreign insurers—sought to 
remove an action filed by a domestic insured, arguing that the dis-
trict court had subject matter jurisdiction because the operative in-
surance policies contained arbitration clauses governed under the 
Convention.64 Like the Safety National court, the ESAB court did 
not resolve the question whether the Convention is self-executing, 
listing reasons why it could be considered both self- and non-self-
executing, and stating “the question of what constitutes a self-exe-
cuting treaty has long confused courts and commentators.”65 
Instead, the court held that the Convention supersedes the MFA 
because the MFA “is limited to legislation within the domestic 
realm.”66 Specifically, the court explained that the MFA did not “ap-
ply to every federal statute” and that Congress did not intend for the 
MFA “to apply so broadly.”67 The court further explained that Con-
gress did not intend for the MFA “to permit state law to vitiate in-
ternational agreements entered by the United States.”68 Finally, the 
court identified a number of occasions where other Courts of Ap-
peals refused to afford the MFA an overly-broad scope and reasoned 
that, because Chapter 2 of the FAA “provides, without exception, 
that the Convention ‘shall be enforced in United States courts,’” 
 
 61 Id. at 725. 
 62 Id. 
 63 685 F.3d 376, 379 (4th Cir. 2012). 
 64 Id. at 380. 
 65 Id. at 387 (citation omitted). 
 66 Id. at 388. 
 67 Id.; See Am. Ins. v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 428 (2003) (“[The MFA 
was] directed to implied preemption by domestic commercial legislation.”). 
 68 ESAB Grp. v. Zurich Ins., 685 F.3d 376, 389 (4th Cir. 2012) (citations 
omitted). 
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Congress intended to replace all contrary state laws.69 The court 
contrasted this language with that of the MFA, which contains “no 
such express direction[,]” and whose aim “is not arbitration or trea-
ties, but ‘domestic commerce legislation.’”70 Because of this, the 
court held that Chapter 2 of the FAA, “as legislation implementing 
a treaty, is not subject to reverse preemption, so insurance disputes 
are not exempt from [Chapter 2] pursuant to [MFA’s] reverse-
preemption rule.”71 Additionally, the court held that—even if Chap-
ter 2 and the MFA are in irreconcilable conflict—the more recent 
Chapter 2 of the FAA would prevail over the MFA.72 
III. CURRENT SITUATION IN THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 
 The Eleventh Circuit has been silent on the interaction be-
tween the MFA and the Convention. This is probably because, as 
explained below, of the three states within the Eleventh Circuit (Al-
abama, Florida and Georgia), Georgia is the only one containing an 
anti-arbitration provision related to the business of insurance.73 
A. Alabama Arbitration Law 
Alabama has not enacted any laws that prohibit or restrict the 
use of arbitration clauses in insurance contracts. Alabama, however, 
does have a general law prohibiting arbitration. Specifically, section 
8-1-41 of the Alabama Code provides that “[a]n agreement to submit 
a controversy to arbitration” “cannot be specifically enforced.”74 
Notwithstanding, the Alabama Supreme Court has held that the stat-
ute does not relate to the business of insurance and, therefore, does 
not benefit from the MFA’s reverse-preemption provision.75 
 
 69 Id. at 389–90 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 201 (2018)). 
 70 Id. at 390 (citing Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 428). 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. at n.6 (citing Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254, 273 (2003)). 
 73 See discussion infra Section III.C; GA. CODE ANN. § 9-9-2(c)(3) (West). 
 74 ALA. CODE § 8-1-41(3) (2003), invalidated by Cent. Reserve Life Ins. v. 
Fox, 869 So. 2d 1124 (Ala. 2003). 
 75 Cent. Reserve Life Ins. v. Fox, 869 So. 2d 1124, 1127 (Ala. 2003); see Am. 
Bankers Ins. of Fla. v. Crawford, 757 So. 2d 1125, 1136 (Ala. 1999). 
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B. Florida Arbitration Law 
Like Alabama, Florida has not enacted any laws that prohibit or 
restrict the use of arbitration clauses in insurance contracts. Unlike 
Alabama, Florida is a relatively pro-arbitration state, containing 
both a domestic and international arbitration code. Specifically, 
Florida has enacted both the Revised Florida Arbitration Code76 and 
the Florida International Commercial Arbitration Act.77 The former 
governs any agreement to arbitrate made on or after July 1, 2013 or 
arbitration proceedings initiated on or after July 1, 2016.78 The latter 
applies to international commercial arbitration, subject to any agree-
ment in force between the United States and any other country or 
countries.79 
C. Georgia Arbitration Law 
Unlike Alabama and Florida, Georgia has enacted legislation ex-
pressly addressing the use of arbitration clauses in insurance con-
tracts. Specifically, the Georgia Arbitration Code excludes “[a]ny 
contract of insurance” from the scope of the act.80 While the Georgia 
Supreme Court and the Eleventh Circuit have both held that Geor-
gia’s anti-arbitration provision reverse-preempts the FAA, the 
courts assessed this conflict in cases involving domestic disputes.81 
In contrast, the analysis yields a different result when confronting 
the MFA and the FAA in the purview of international disputes. In 
Goshawk Dedicated Ltd. v. Portsmouth Settlement Co. I, Inc., the 
court held Georgia’s anti-arbitration provision does not conflict with 
the Convention because the MFA only applies to arbitration agree-
ments within the United States.82 The court arrived at its decision by 
citing other district court decisions that held that the MFA “applies 
 
 76 Revised Florida Arbitration Code, FLA. STAT. §§ 682.01–.25 (2019). 
 77 Florida International Commercial Arbitration Act, FLA. STAT. 
§§ 684.0001–.0049 (2019). 
 78 FLA. STAT. § 682.013. The Revised Florida Arbitration Code replaced the 
Florida Arbitration Code, which had been in effect since 1957. 
 79 FLA. STAT. § 684.0002(1). 
 80 GA. CODE ANN. § 9-9-2(c)(3) (2019). 
 81 McKnight v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., 358 F.3d 854, 855 (11th Cir. 2004); 
Love v. Money Tree, Inc., 614 S.E.2d 47, 48 (Ga. 2005). 
 82 466 F. Supp. 2d 1293, 1302–03 (N.D. Ga. 2006). 
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only to domestic agreements, and thus the Convention . . . con-
trols.”83 Because of this, and following “the Eleventh Circuit’s man-
date that ‘[t]he Convention must be enforced according to its terms 
over all prior inconsistent rules of law,’” the court held that the 
MFA—a prior federal law—could not be used as a defense to the 
Convention.84 In light of this mandate from the Eleventh Circuit, the 
court found that the Stephens85 decision out of the Second Circuit—
which did not address the issue of the MFA being passed before 
Chapter 2 of the FAA—was “unpersuasive.”86 
Similarly, in Lloyds Underwriters v. Netterstrom, the court 
adopted the position of the District Court of the Northern District of 
Georgia in Goshawk Dedicated v. Portsmouth,87 holding the McCar-
ran-Ferguson Act applies only to arbitration agreements within the 
United States and that it has no effect on an international arbitration 
agreement that is governed by the Convention.88 The court deter-
mined in the case of conflict between the FAA and the MFA, “[t]he 
[FAA] must give way to contrary provisions of state laws regulating 
the business of insurance” under the MFA.89 However, in the case 
of conflict between state laws regulating insurance and international 
arbitration, which is the subject matter of the Convention, the latter 
will prevail over states laws by reason of the Convention being an 
 
 83 Id. at 1302–03 (citing In re Arbitration Between England Ship Owners 
Mut. Ins. Ass’n (Luxembourg) & Am. Marine Corp., No. 91-3645, 1992 WL 
37700, at *4–5 (E.D. La. Feb. 18, 1992); Triton Lines, Inc. v. Steamship Mut. 
Underwriting Ass’n. Ltd., 707 F. Supp. 277, 278–79 (S.D. Tex. 1989)). 
 84 Id. at 1304–05 (citing Indus. Risk Insurers v. M.A.N. Gutehoffnungshutte 
GmbH, 141 F.3d 1434, 1441 (11th Cir. 1998)). In arriving at this conclusion, the 
court also relied on the Eleventh Circuit’s ruling in Bautista v. Star Cruises, 396 
F.3d 1289, 1302 (11th Cir. 2005), holding that “domestic defenses to arbitration 
may only be recognized under the Convention ‘if there exists a precise, universal 
definition . . . that may be applied effectively across the range of countries that 
are parties to the Convention . . . .’” Goshawk Dedicated v. Portsmouth Settle-
ment Co. I, 466 F. Supp. 2d 1293, 1305 (N.D. Ga. 2006) (citations omitted). 
 85 Stephens v. Am. Int’l Ins., 66 F.3d 41, 42 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 86 Goshawk, 466 F. Supp. at 1305 n.9. 
 87 Id. at 1293. 
 88 Lloyds Underwriters v. Netterstrom, 17 So. 3d 732, 737–38 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2009). 
 89 Id. at 737. 
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international agreement between the United States and other na-
tions.90 
Furthermore, in Lloyds Underwriters91 and in Goshawk,92 the 
courts buttressed their decisions on the holding from Bautista v. Star 
Cruises,93 holding that the non-domestic international arbitration 
agreements were enforceable. In Bautista, the court restated the 
long-standing principle that the FAA ‘“generally establishes a 
strong presumption in favor of arbitration of international commer-
cial disputes,’” and that an international arbitration agreement is en-
forceable under the Convention if (1) it is in writing; (2) it provides 
for arbitration in the territory of a signatory of the Convention; (3) 
the agreement arises out of a commercial legal relationship; and (4) 
a party to the agreement is not an American citizen.94 
Therefore, under the state of affairs in the Eleventh Circuit, state 
laws regulating the business of insurance will not prevent the FAA 
in the context of international arbitration. 
IV. ADDRESSING THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE CONVENTION AND 
THE MCCARRAN-FERGUSON ACT 
The issue of preemption between the MFA and the Convention 
is complex. To resolve it, courts might rely on constitutional provi-
sions, precedent, statutory interpretation, and principles of interna-
tional law. This Article explains how, through the correct applica-
tion of these tools, the Convention supersedes conflicting provisions 
under the MFA. 
A. Supremacy Clause 
The Convention, as an international treaty, is supreme law of the 
land under the Constitution; therefore, conflicting state law provi-
sions are preempted by the Supremacy Clause, which establishes 
federal law’s supremacy over state law.95 This clause, which usually 
 
 90 Id. 
 91 17 So. 3d at 737. 
 92 466 F. Supp. at 1305. 
 93 396 F.3d at 1294. 
 94 Id. (quoting Indus. Risk Insurers v. M.A.N. Gutehoffnungshutte GmbH, 
141 F.3d 1434, 1440 (11th Cir. 1998)). 
 95 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
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requires a straightforward analysis, becomes complex when the 
courts are confronted with the reverse preemption provision from 
the MFA or the application of the distinction between treaties that 
are “self-executing” and those that are not. This distinction is rele-
vant because some courts have concluded that non-self-executing 
treaties are not binding on the United States until they have been 
fully implemented.96 Accordingly, a treaty that is not self-executing 
is not afforded supremacy under the Constitution.97 
The Supreme Court first introduced the distinction between self-
executing and non-self-executing treaties in Foster v. Neilson.98 In 
Foster, the Court examined the Spain-United States treaty for its do-
mestic effects and held that, when a treaty does not contain self-ex-
ecuting language but merely states a pledge to enact further legisla-
tion, the treaty does not take effect or become the supreme law of 
the land unless Congress performs the legislative act.99 The Conven-
tion expressly states that a contracting state’s courts “shall, at the 
request of one of the parties, refer the parties to arbitration . . . .”100 
This provision is not addressed to the executive or legislative 
branch, instead, it commands the judiciary to refer to arbitration 
those matters in which the parties made a valid arbitration agreement 
within the meaning of the Convention.101 
The precise nature of this distinction, and its very existence, is a 
matter of controversy.102 “Congress will often bypass any chance of 
doubt concerning the force of a treaty by enacting implementing leg-
islation.”103 Out of an abundance of caution, Congress amended the 
FAA to implement the Convention by requiring courts to enforce 
 
 96 See Forster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253, 314 (1829). 
 97 Id. 
 98 Id. In Foster, the Court made the distinction between those treaties where 
the parties engaged to perform a particular act by the political branches, which 
required legislation to be executed by the courts, and those treaties that were ad-
dressed to the Judicial department, and considered the latter to be self-executing. 
See id. 
 99 Id. at 314–15. 
 100 New York Convention, supra note 28, art. II, cl. 3. 
 101 See id. 
 102 See, e.g., Carlos Manuel Vazquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing 
Treaties, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 695, 695 (1995). 
 103 J. Logan Murphy, Law Triangle: Arbitrating International Reinsurance 
Disputes Under the New York Convention, the McCarran-Ferguson Act, and An-
tagonistic State Law, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1535, 1552 (2008). 
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arbitration agreements,104 provided that the two instruments would 
enter into force at the same time. 
Furthermore, the Convention was ratified by the Senate and 
signed by the U.S. President, satisfying the requirements under the 
Constitution to enjoy supremacy over state laws.105 Accordingly, 
state laws should not preempt the Convention as it relates to recog-
nition and enforcement of international arbitration agreements. 
Courts are required to interpret the FAA consistently with the Con-
vention to achieve its objective and fulfill its purpose. 
Congress cannot implicitly remove the supremacy given to in-
ternational treaties by the Constitution and empower state anti-arbi-
tration provisions because the supremacy clause mandates that states 
laws conflicting with the international treaties are invalid.106 Addi-
tionally, treaty-making is not one of Congress’ enumerated powers, 
but a function shared with the executive.107 Allowing state legisla-
tion to preempt treaties creates inconsistencies irreconcilable with 
the national character required for international treaties. In Federal-
ist Papers Number 75, Alexander Hamilton explained that the 
“treaty making” function was placed in the Senate to achieve “a 
steady and systematic adherence to the same views; a nice and uni-
form sensibility to national character . . . .”108 Uniformity and na-
tional character are not achieved when Congress allows the states to 
enact provisions inconsistent with international obligations. Conse-
quently, Congress cannot grant preemption to state regulations that 
directly conflict with international treaty obligations. 
B. Last-In-Time Rule 
Under the last-in-time rule, the Convention controls over con-
flicting provisions from the McCarran Ferguson Act. In 1870, the 
Supreme Court first held that a federal law may supersede a treaty 
and vice-versa.109 In Breard v. Greene, the Court affirmed that “an 
 
 104 See H.R. REP. NO. 91-1181 (1970), as reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
3601, 3603. 
 105 9 U.S.C. § 201 (2018). 
 106 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 107 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
 108 THE FEDERALIST NO. 75, at 266 (Alexander Hamilton) (Terence Ball ed., 
2003) [hereinafter Hamilton, THE FEDERALIST NO. 75]. 
 109 The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. 616, 621 (1870). 
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Act of Congress . . . is on a full parity with a treaty, and that when a 
statute which is subsequent in time is inconsistent with a treaty, the 
statute to the extent of conflict renders the treaty null.”110 By the 
same token, if a treaty and a federal statute conflict, “the one last in 
date will control the other.”111 
Thus, whether or not a treaty is self-executing, when a federal 
statute and an international treaty conflict, courts are required to ap-
ply the last-in-time rule. This general principle allows Congress to 
modify or repeal treaties by enacting subsequent legislation, even if 
those enactments amount to violations of treaties under international 
law.112 
The MFA is incompatible with the Convention because it grants 
federal law status to state laws regulating the business of insur-
ance.113 In contrast, the Convention mandates that arbitration agree-
ments must be enforced unless they fall within the enumerated 
grounds under the convention. Because the business of insurance is 
not contemplated as a defense to enforcement under the Convention, 
the application of both provisions is impossible. 
Chapter 2 of the FAA was enacted on July 31, 1970, providing 
that it will be effective upon entry into force of the Convention.114 
The Convention was entered into force for the United States on De-
cember 29, 1970.115 The MFA was enacted on March 9, 1945.116 
Accordingly, under the last-in-time rule, the Convention should con-
trol in cases where it conflicts with the MFA. 
C. Policy Favoring Arbitration 
“While Congress acted to preserve the states’ dominance in in-
surance regulation, it moved” in the opposite direction to federalize 
the policies regarding arbitration.117 The development of modern 
American arbitration policy tracks a global movement toward the 
acceptance of international arbitration. Following this trend, the 
 
 110 523 U.S. 371, 376 (1998) (quoting Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 18 (1957)). 
 111 Id. (quoting Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888)). 
 112 Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 597, 599 (1884). 
 113 See 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (2018). 
 114 Federal Arbitration Act, Pub. L. No. 91–368, §2, 84 Stat. 693 (1970). 
 115 Id. § 4. 
 116 McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–1015 (1946). 
 117 ESAB Grp. v. Zurich Ins. PLC, 685 F.3d 376, 380 (4th Cir. 2012). 
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United States enacted Chapter 1 of the FAA to liberalize the enforce-
ment of arbitration in maritime and commercial contracts.118 Fur-
thermore, the policy favoring international arbitration was widely 
expanded by the Supreme Court in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler 
Chrysler–Plymouth, Inc.119 In Mitsubishi Motors, a dispute arose 
between a car dealer and a joint venture car manufacturer.120 The 
parties’ contract contained an arbitration agreement, which provided 
that ‘“[a]ll disputes, controversies or differences which may arise 
between [the parties] out of or in relation to [the contract] or for the 
breach thereof, shall be finally settled by arbitration in Japan in ac-
cordance with the rules and regulations of the Japan Commercial 
Arbitration Association.’”121 The dealer asserted an antitrust coun-
terclaim against the Joint Venture.122 The Court held that in the light 
of the clear intention of Congress, it was its obligation to shake off 
the old judicial hostility towards arbitration, as well as the “unwill-
ingness to cede jurisdiction of a claim arising under domestic law to 
a foreign or transnational tribunal.”123 
Some courts have concluded that the MFA should yield to the 
strong policy favoring arbitration because “there is some indication 
in the legislative history of the MFA that it was [limited] to [Inter-
state] Commerce Clause Legislation” and not foreign commerce.124 
This is a valid conclusion considering that Congress enacted the 
MFA under its power to regulate interstate commerce. Therefore, 
states’ anti-arbitration provisions should yield to the Convention be-
cause there exists strong policy considerations in favor of arbitra-
tion. 
 
 118 See generally 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16. 
 119 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 
627–28 (1985). 
 120 Id. at 616–17. 
 121 Id. at 617. 
 122 Id. at 620. 
 123 Id. at 638. 
 124 Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. SR Int’l Bus., No. 07–CV–1071, 2007 WL 
2752366, at *3 (W.D. Ark. Sept. 20, 2007) (quoting Stephens v. Nat’l Distillers 
and Chem. Corp., 69 F.3d 1225, 1231 n.5 (2d Cir. 1995); see also Goshawk Ded-
icated Ltd. v. Portsmouth Settlement Co., 466 F. Supp. 2d 1293, 1306 (N.D. Ga. 
2006). 
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D. Statutory Interpretation 
In its 1804 decision, Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, the 
Supreme Court stated that “an act of Congress ought never to be 
construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construc-
tion remains . . . .”125 Since then, the Charming Betsy canon of con-
struction has become an important component of the legal regime 
defining the U.S. relationship with international law. It is applied 
regularly by the Supreme Court and lower federal courts, and it is 
enshrined in the black-letter-law provisions of the Restatement 
(Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States.126 
Enactment of Chapter 2 of the FAA was an act of Congress 
aligning domestic legislation to comply with international obliga-
tions under both the Charming Betsy canon and the last-in-time rule; 
had Congress wanted to provide a particular meaning, it could have 
done so. Similarly, were Congress to have wanted state insurance 
laws to preempt the Convention, it could have enacted legislation to 
repeal the Convention. In the meantime, courts are required to inter-
pret the MFA in a manner that does not violate the international ob-
ligations imposed by the Convention. 
E. Principle of Good Faith 
The Convention is an international agreement that ought to be 
performed in good faith. As Alexander Hamilton explained in the 
Federalist Papers Number 75, the power making treaties does not 
relate to the execution of laws, or to the creation of new ones, instead 
“[i]ts objects are CONTRACTS with foreign nations, which have 
the force of law, but derive it from the obligations of good faith.”127 
Such an analogy reflects the idea that international treaties must be 
performed in good faith. 
The principle of good faith is an accepted principle of interna-
tional law under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(“VCLT”), which states that “[e]very treaty in force is binding upon 
 
 125 Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804). 
 126 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE 
UNITED STATES § 114 (AM. LAW INST. 1986). 
 127 Hamilton, THE FEDERALIST NO. 75, supra note 108, at 265 (emphasis in 
original). 
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the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.”128 
States may not invoke the internal law provisions as a justification 
for failure to comply with the United States’ obligations under in-
ternational law because states are bound to interpret treaties “in good 
faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the 
terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and 
purpose.”129 This principle is binding upon the United States as cus-
tomary international law and a general principle of international law 
recognized by nations throughout the world.130 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has recognized that “[i]nterna-
tional law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and adminis-
tered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as 
questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their de-
termination.”131 The Court, however, noted that “where there is no 
treaty, . . . resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized 
nations.”132 Therefore, to fulfill its treaty obligations in good faith 
in compliance with the terms of the VCLT, U.S. courts must enforce 
international arbitration agreements, even in insurance contracts, 
which are traditionally governed by states’ laws. 
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. Conclusions 
Consistent case law in the Eleventh Circuit demonstrates a 
strong likelihood that the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals would 
refuse to apply the reverse-preemption provision in the MFA to in-
validate an agreement to arbitrate under the Convention. 
Congress did not intend that a treaty, like the Convention, would 
be within the scope of the reverse-preemption provision in the MFA. 
The term “Act of Congress” in the MFA referred strictly to legisla-
 
 128 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 26, Jan. 7, 1980, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331. 
 129 See id. art. 31. 
 130 Hamilton, THE FEDERALIST NO. 75, supra note 108, at 467–95. 
 131 In re The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). 
 132 Id. 
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tive activity because the legislative history of the MFA does not in-
dicate that Congress intended to reverse-preempt an implemented 
treaty whether self-executing or not. 
B.  Recommendations 
This Article recommends that Congress amend the MFA to de-
fine the term “Act of Congress” as limited to the legislative activities 
under Article I of the United States Constitution. 
Congress should amend the MFA to state that anti-arbitration 
provisions are valid only in domestic cases so as not to interfere with 
international obligations under the Convention. Moreover, Congress 
should amend the MFA to, or enact other legislation that would, 
state that enforcement of arbitration agreements should be enforce-
able in the business of insurance. 
 
